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INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM ON
INTEGRATING NEW ECONOMIC LEARNING
WITH ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
Antitrust is one of only a handful of legal fields (tax is another) in
which practitioners and academics share similar research agendas and
routinely read and refer to each other's writing. This is nowhere more
evident than in the articles in this academic symposium. All the authors
are professors at the top of their game, each article draws on the most
recent scholarship in both law and economics, and each article is directly
relevant to the practical concerns of judges and lawyers.
The possibility of predatory distribution by dominant firms has gener-
ated several notable court cases during the past few years.' Andrew Gavil's
critical synthesis of the law in this area concludes that the recent decisions
are broadly consistent with a reasonable emerging legal framework.2 The
article also suggests how courts can better integrate the substance of
monopolization law with a more coherent procedural structure under
Section 2 in light of the Supreme Court's most recent monopolization
decision.3
Robert Marshall and Michael Meurer examine carefully the similarities
and differences between auction markets and posted-price markets with
respect to their vulnerability to collusion. 4 In doing so, they provide a
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E.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); LePage's Inc. v. 3M
Co., 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004); Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-
Cola, Co., 315 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2002); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Virgin Ad.
Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001); Concord Boat Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
2 Andrew I. Gavil, Dominant Firm Distribution: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 3 (2004).
3 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 872,
881 (2004).
4 Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining
the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 83 (2004).
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comprehensive synthesis of the modem economic literature on auction
theory and highlight the main points of interest for antitrust.
Finally, Aaron Edlin and Daniel Rubinfeld offer an instructive analysis
of academic journal publishing.5 They ask whether the high prices of
for-profitjournals relative to similar non-profitjournals reflect the exer-
cise of market power, whether those high prices are connected with
recent publisher innovations in journal marketing involving bundling
of journals in disparate fields, and how those bundling practices would
be addressed under existing antitrust doctrines. The article uses the
case study of journal publishing as a vehicle for making concrete the
significance of recent developments in the law and economics of monop-
olization, foreclosures, and tying.
This Symposium was originally presented as a program of the Antitrust
and Economic Regulation Section of the Association of American Law
Schools, at the AALS annual meeting inJanuary 2004. At that conference,
the papers were discussed by Professors Jean Wegman Burns (Brigham
Young University), Keith Hylton (Boston University), and Barbara Ann
White (University of Baltimore).
5 Aaron Edlin & Daniel Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The "Big Deal" Bundling
of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119 (2004).
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